School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States.
School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, United States; Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Theoretical Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Romania.
Conscious Cogn. 2022 Apr;100:103281. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281. Epub 2022 Mar 21.
In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt's Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi's and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.
在本文中，我们采取元理论立场，比较和评估两个试图解释现象经验的概念框架。特别是，我们比较了 Feinberg 和 Mallatt 的神经生物学自然主义（NN）和 Tononi 及其同事的综合信息理论（IIT），因为前者指出了这两个理论之间的一些相似之处（Feinberg 和 Mallatt 2016c-d）。为了探究它们的相似性，我们首先对这两个框架进行了总体介绍。接下来，我们阐述了进行分析的基本方案。然后，我们阐明了 NN 和 IIT 的哲学概要，探讨了它们的本体论承诺和认识论基础。最后，我们逐点比较了这两个理论，还讨论了它们在人工意识问题上的立场。
