School of Economics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 260071, China.
College of Finance and Economics, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Taian 271000, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2022 Aug 12;19(16):9964. doi: 10.3390/ijerph19169964.
Green development is necessary for China to carry out high-quality economic development. As an important institutional arrangement in the vertical government structure, fiscal decentralization supports regional green development. Local government environmental preferences indicate local environmental protection awareness and affect the process of regional green development to a certain extent. Based on the review of relevant theories and literature, this study conducts an empirical analysis based on Chinese provincial panel data from 2007 to 2019 using a two-way fixed effects model and a panel threshold model. Both revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization have a U-shaped nonlinear relationship with the green development efficiency calculated by the superefficiency SBM model, which includes undesirable output. Neither factor has a positive effect on green development efficiency at this stage, while local government environmental preferences are positively connected to green development efficiency. Furthermore, a moderating effect is observed in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and green development efficiency. Under the same level of revenue decentralization or expenditure decentralization, the stronger the environmental preferences of the local authority are, the higher the green development efficiency. This moderating effect is more significant in coastal areas than inland areas. Further research reveals a threshold for the moderating effect of local government environmental preferences on fiscal decentralization on green development. When the environmental preferences of local government are below the threshold, both revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization significantly inhibit the improvement in green development efficiency. After the threshold is passed, the negative effects of both on green development efficiency are markedly curtailed. Then, the government performance appraisal system should be further optimized, fiscal decentralization reform should be strengthened, local financial investment in environmental protection should be expanded, and synergistic regional development should be promoted. China's green development should be promoted to an advanced stage.
绿色发展是中国实现高质量经济发展的必然选择。财政分权作为纵向政府结构中的一项重要制度安排，支持着区域绿色发展。地方政府环境偏好表明了地方的环境保护意识，并在一定程度上影响着区域绿色发展的进程。在回顾相关理论和文献的基础上，本文利用中国 2007-2019 年省级面板数据，采用双向固定效应模型和面板门槛模型进行实证分析。收入分权和支出分权与超效率 SBM 模型计算的绿色发展效率（包含非期望产出）均呈 U 型非线性关系，现阶段两个因素均对绿色发展效率没有正向作用，而地方政府环境偏好与绿色发展效率呈正相关。此外，财政分权与绿色发展效率之间存在调节效应。在相同的收入分权或支出分权水平下，地方政府环境偏好越强，绿色发展效率越高。这种调节效应在沿海地区比内陆地区更为显著。进一步研究揭示了地方政府环境偏好对财政分权与绿色发展关系的调节作用存在门槛。当地方政府环境偏好低于门槛值时，收入分权和支出分权均显著抑制了绿色发展效率的提高。当超过门槛值后，两者对绿色发展效率的负向作用明显减弱。为此，应进一步优化政府绩效评估体系，加强财政分权改革，扩大地方财政对环境保护的投入，促进协同区域发展，推动中国绿色发展迈向更高阶段。
