School of Economics, Guangzhou College of Commerce, Guangzhou, P. R. China.
School of Finance, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, P. R. China.
PLoS One. 2023 Jan 27;18(1):e0281120. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0281120. eCollection 2023.
It is an important measure in the reform of state-owned enterprises to improve the efficiency of capital operation by introducing non-state-owned shareholders. This paper explores the impact of non-state shareholder governance on capital structure decision-making by using the data of 2008-2021 A-share state-owned listed companies from the perspective of the speed and deviation of capital structure adjustment. The results reveal that only non-state shareholding has no significant impact on the capital structure adjustment of a company. However, the appointment of senior management by non-state shareholders can speed up the capital structure adjustment and lower the degree of capital structure deviation. Moreover, when the capital structure goes down, the appointment of non-state-owned shareholders plays a larger role in accelerating the capital structure adjustment, which makes the deviation from the actual capital structure and the target capital structure smaller. Further research shows that the above relationship between non-state shareholder governance and the optimization and adjustment of the capital structure only exists in local SOEs and competitive SOEs. In addition, the path test found that non-state shareholder governance affects the dynamic adjustment of capital structure by reducing opportunism behavior of management rather than by financing constraints.
引入非国有股东以提高资本运营效率是国有企业改革的重要措施。本文从资本结构调整速度和偏离度的角度，利用 2008-2021 年 A 股国有上市公司的数据，探讨了非国有股东治理对资本结构决策的影响。结果表明，只有非国有持股对公司的资本结构调整没有显著影响。然而，非国有股东对高管的任命可以加快资本结构调整，降低资本结构偏离度。此外，当资本结构下降时，非国有股东的任命在加速资本结构调整方面发挥更大的作用，使实际资本结构与目标资本结构的偏差更小。进一步的研究表明，非国有股东治理与资本结构优化调整之间的上述关系仅存在于地方国有企业和竞争性国有企业中。此外，路径检验发现，非国有股东治理通过减少管理层的机会主义行为而不是通过融资约束来影响资本结构的动态调整。
