Centre for Research in Ethics, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada.
The Graduate Center, CUNY, New York, NY, USA.
Sci Rep. 2023 Mar 30;13(1):5183. doi: 10.1038/s41598-023-32242-y.
Evaluative judgments imply positive or negative regard. But there are different ways in which something can be positive or negative. How do we tell them apart? According to Evaluative Sentimentalism, different evaluations (e.g., dangerousness vs. offensiveness) are grounded on different emotions (e.g., fear vs. anger). If this is the case, evaluation differentiation requires emotional awareness. Here, we test this hypothesis by looking at alexithymia, a deficit in emotional awareness consisting of problems identifying, describing, and thinking about emotions. The results of Study 1 suggest that high alexithymia is not only related to problems distinguishing emotions, but also to problems distinguishing evaluations. Study 2 replicated this latter effect after controlling for individual differences in attentional impulsiveness and reflective reasoning, and found that reasoning makes an independent contribution to evaluation differentiation. These results suggest that emotional sensibilities play an irreducible role in evaluative judgment while affording a role for reasoning.
评价判断暗示着积极或消极的看法。但是，事物具有积极或消极的方式有很多种。我们如何区分它们？根据评价情感主义，不同的评价（例如，危险性与冒犯性）基于不同的情感（例如，恐惧与愤怒）。如果是这样，那么评价的区分就需要情感意识。在这里，我们通过考察情绪意识缺陷——即识别、描述和思考情绪方面存在问题的述情障碍，来检验这一假设。研究 1 的结果表明，高度述情障碍不仅与区分情绪的问题有关，而且与区分评价的问题有关。研究 2 在控制注意力冲动和反思推理的个体差异后，复制了后一种影响，并发现推理对评价区分有独立的贡献。这些结果表明，情感敏感性在评价判断中起着不可简化的作用，同时也为推理提供了作用。
