Gomes-Ng Stephanie, Cowie Sarah, Elliffe Douglas
Auckland University of Technology, New Zealand.
The University of Auckland, New Zealand.
J Exp Anal Behav. 2023 Sep;120(2):171-185. doi: 10.1002/jeab.855. Epub 2023 May 15.
Organisms may sometimes behave as if a contingency exists between behavior and consequences, even if this is not actually the case. Killeen (1978) suggested that such superstition occurs because of factors that bias subjects to behave "superstitiously" rather than because of failures of discrimination. We systematically replicated Killeen's experiment and compared contingency discrimination between different consequences. Six pigeons responded in a matching-to-sample procedure in which a response-independent or response-dependent stimulus change, food delivery, or blackout occurred. The pigeons reported whether the consequence was response dependent or response independent by choosing between two side keys. Discrimination was strongest after stimulus changes, weaker after blackouts, and weakest after food deliveries. These differences persisted even after additional training, suggesting asymmetries that may reflect differences in the disruptive effects of different consequences on remembering and/or behavioral mnemonics. Importantly, the pigeons were not biased to report response-dependent consequences unless that response was consistent with locational biases; that is, they behaved "superstitiously" when there was a reason to be biased to do so. These findings corroborate Killeen's and demonstrate that behavior may deviate from contingencies not necessarily because subjects cannot discriminate those contingencies but because they are biased to behave otherwise.
有机体有时可能表现得好像行为与结果之间存在一种偶然联系,即便实际并非如此。基林(1978)提出,这种迷信行为的出现是由于一些因素使实验对象倾向于表现出“迷信”行为,而非因为辨别能力的缺失。我们系统地重复了基林的实验,并比较了不同结果之间的偶然辨别情况。六只鸽子在一个样本匹配程序中做出反应,在此程序中,会出现与反应无关或与反应有关的刺激变化、食物投递或灯光熄灭。鸽子通过在两个侧键之间做出选择来报告结果是与反应有关还是与反应无关。在刺激变化后辨别能力最强,在灯光熄灭后较弱,在食物投递后最弱。即使经过额外训练,这些差异仍然存在,这表明存在不对称性,可能反映了不同结果对记忆和/或行为记忆术的干扰作用的差异。重要的是,除非这种反应与位置偏差一致,鸽子不会倾向于报告与反应有关的结果;也就是说,当有理由产生偏差时,它们才会表现出“迷信”行为。这些发现证实了基林的观点,并表明行为可能偏离偶然联系,不一定是因为实验对象无法辨别这些偶然联系,而是因为它们倾向于表现出其他行为。