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精神隐私、认知自由与捆绑限制

Mental Privacy, Cognitive Liberty, and Hog-tying.

作者信息

Crutchfield P

机构信息

Department of Medical Ethics, Humanities, and Law, Western Michigan University Homer Stryker M.D. School of Medicine, 1000 Oakland Drive, Kalamazoo, MI, 49008, USA.

出版信息

J Bioeth Inq. 2024 Dec;21(4):695-710. doi: 10.1007/s11673-024-10344-0. Epub 2024 Jun 3.

Abstract

As the science and technology of the brain and mind develop, so do the ways in which brains and minds may be surveilled and manipulated. Some cognitive libertarians worry that these developments undermine cognitive liberty or "freedom of thought." I argue that protecting an individual's cognitive liberty undermines others' ability to use their own cognitive liberty. Given that the threatening devices and processes are not relevantly different from ordinary and frequent intrusions upon one's brain and mind, strong protections of cognitive liberty may proscribe neurotechnological intrusions but also ordinary intrusions. Thus, the cognitive libertarian position "hog-ties" others' use of their own liberties. This problem for the cognitive libertarian is the same problem that ordinary libertarianism faces in protecting individual rights to property and person. But the libertarian strategies for resolving the problem don't work for the cognitive libertarian. I conclude that the right to mental privacy is weaker than what cognitive libertarians want it to be.

摘要

随着大脑与心智科学技术的发展,大脑与心智被监测和操纵的方式也在发展。一些认知自由意志主义者担心这些发展会损害认知自由或“思想自由”。我认为,保护个人的认知自由会损害他人运用自身认知自由的能力。鉴于那些具有威胁性的手段和过程与对一个人的大脑和心智的普通且频繁的侵扰并无实质差异,对认知自由的强力保护可能会禁止神经技术侵扰,但也会禁止普通侵扰。因此,认知自由意志主义立场会“束缚”他人对自身自由的运用。认知自由意志主义者面临的这个问题与普通自由意志主义在保护个人财产权和人身权时所面临的问题相同。但自由意志主义者解决该问题的策略对认知自由意志主义者并不适用。我的结论是精神隐私的权利比认知自由意志主义者所期望的要弱。

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