Zhang Qiandong, Zhang Kejia, Hou Kunchi, Zhang Long
School of Mathematical Science, Heilongjiang University, Harbin 150080, China.
State Key Laboratory of Public Big Data, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550000, China.
Entropy (Basel). 2024 Jul 29;26(8):644. doi: 10.3390/e26080644.
To address the potential threat to the power grid industry posed by quantum computers and ensure the security of bidirectional communication in smart grids, it is imperative to develop quantum-safe authentication protocols. This paper proposes a semi-quantum bidirectional authentication protocol between a control center (CC) and a neighboring gateway (NG). This method uses single photons to facilitate communication between the CC and the NG. Security analysis demonstrates that the protocol can effectively resist common attack methods, including double CNOT attacks, impersonation attacks, interception-measurement-retransmission attacks, and entanglement-measurement attacks. Comparisons with other protocols reveal that this protocol has significant advantages, making it more appealing and practical for real-world applications. Finally, by simulating the protocol on the IBM quantum simulator, this protocol not only validates the theoretical framework but also confirms the practical feasibility of the protocol.
为应对量子计算机对电网行业构成的潜在威胁,并确保智能电网中双向通信的安全性,开发量子安全认证协议势在必行。本文提出了一种控制中心(CC)与相邻网关(NG)之间的半量子双向认证协议。该方法使用单光子来促进CC与NG之间的通信。安全分析表明,该协议能够有效抵御常见的攻击方法,包括双CNOT攻击、伪装攻击、拦截测量重传攻击和纠缠测量攻击。与其他协议的比较表明,该协议具有显著优势,使其在实际应用中更具吸引力和实用性。最后,通过在IBM量子模拟器上对该协议进行模拟,该协议不仅验证了理论框架,还证实了协议的实际可行性。