Shepherd Joshua
Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona, Facultat Filosofia y Letres, Carrer de la Fortuna, Cerdanyola del Vallès, 08193 Barcelona, Spain.
ICREA, Passeig Lluís Companys 23, Barcelona, Spain.
AI Soc. 2024;39(6):3005-3015. doi: 10.1007/s00146-023-01835-6. Epub 2024 Jan 12.
Many think that a specific aspect of phenomenal consciousness-valenced or affective experience-is essential to consciousness's moral significance (valence sentientism). They hold that valenced experience is necessary for well-being, or moral status, or psychological intrinsic value (or all three). Some think that phenomenal consciousness generally is necessary for non-derivative moral significance (broad sentientism). Few think that consciousness is unnecessary for moral significance (non-necessitarianism). In this paper, I consider the prospects for these views. I first consider the prospects for valence sentientism in light of Vulcans, beings who are conscious but without affect or valence of any sort. I think Vulcans pressure us to accept broad sentientism. But I argue that a consideration of explanations for broad sentientism opens up possible explanations for non-necessitarianism about the moral significance of consciousness. That is, once one leans away from valence sentientism because of Vulcans, one should feel pressure to accept a view on which consciousness is not necessary for well-being, moral status, or psychological intrinsic value.
许多人认为，现象意识的一个特定方面——有正负效价或情感体验——对于意识的道德意义至关重要（效价情感主义）。他们认为，有正负效价的体验对于幸福、道德地位或心理内在价值（或三者皆有）来说是必要的。一些人认为，一般而言，现象意识对于非派生的道德意义是必要的（广义情感主义）。很少有人认为意识对于道德意义是不必要的（非必然主义）。在本文中，我将探讨这些观点的前景。我首先根据瓦肯人来探讨效价情感主义的前景，瓦肯人是有意识但没有任何情感或正负效价的存在。我认为瓦肯人促使我们接受广义情感主义。但我认为，对广义情感主义的解释的思考为关于意识的道德意义的非必然主义开辟了可能的解释。也就是说，一旦因为瓦肯人而偏离了效价情感主义，就应该感受到接受一种观点的压力，即意识对于幸福、道德地位或心理内在价值并非必要。
