Karlan Dean, Linden Leigh L
Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, Global Poverty Research Lab, NBER, CEPR, United States.
The University of Texas at Austin, BREAD, IZA, J-PAL, NBER, United States.
J Dev Econ. 2025 May;174:103444. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103444.
Commitment devices offer an opportunity to restrict future choices. However, strict commitments may deter participation. Using a school-based commitment savings program for children to save for educational expenses in Uganda, we compare an account fully committed to school expenses to an account with a weaker commitment (funds withdrawn in cash, rather than a voucher). Children save more in the weaker commitment treatment arm, and when combined with parental outreach spend more on educational supplies and score 0.10 standard deviations (standard error = 0.04) on test scores. The fully committed account yields no such educational improvements, and neither account finds impacts on secondary or downstream outcomes such as attendance, enrollment, or non-cognitive skills.
承诺机制提供了限制未来选择的机会。然而,严格的承诺可能会阻碍参与。我们在乌干达开展了一项针对儿童的校内承诺储蓄计划,让他们为教育费用存钱,在此过程中,我们将一个完全用于教育支出的账户与一个承诺较弱的账户(现金取款,而非使用代金券)进行了比较。在承诺较弱的处理组中,孩子们储蓄得更多,并且在与家长沟通后,在教育用品上的花费更多,考试成绩提高了0.10个标准差(标准误差=0.04)。完全用于教育支出的账户并没有带来这样的教育改善,而且两个账户对诸如出勤率、入学率或非认知技能等二级或下游结果均未产生影响。