Atkinson G M
J Med Philos. 1983 May;8(2):159-68. doi: 10.1093/jmp/8.2.159.
In a recent article Carla Kary (1980) attempts to show that there can be a significant moral difference between instances of killing and letting die. I shall maintain in Section I that Kary's argument is somewhat weakened by her failure to note an important ambiguity in the notion of killing a person. I shall also argue in Section II that a similar ambiguity affects the notion of letting someone die, and that failure to note this latter ambiguity also weakens the position developed by Robert Coburn (1980) with regard to defective newborns.
在最近的一篇文章中，卡拉·卡里（1980年）试图表明，杀人与听任死亡的情形之间可能存在重大的道德差异。在第一节中，我将指出，卡里的论点因她未能注意到“杀人”这一概念中的一个重要歧义而有所削弱。在第二节中，我还将论证，类似的歧义影响“听任某人死亡”的概念，而未能注意到后一种歧义也削弱了罗伯特·科伯恩（1980年）就有缺陷新生儿所提出的观点。
