Cramer D, Kupshik G
Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, UK.
Br J Clin Psychol. 1993 Sep;32(3):319-25. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8260.1993.tb01062.x.
Ellis's rational-emotive theory postulates that since irrational statements augment emotional distress, replacing irrational with rational statements should lessen distress. This hypothesis was tested in the initial stages of psychotherapy by having 13 and 14 clinical out-patients respectively repeat for one minute either rational or irrational statements about their major presenting psychological problem. The distinction by Ellis & Harper (1975) that 'inappropriate' emotions differ qualitatively from 'appropriate' emotions was also examined. Although the experimental intervention had no effect on a post-test measure of irrational beliefs, patients repeating rational statements had significantly lower appropriate and inappropriate negative emotions at post-test, suggesting that inappropriate emotions do not differ qualitatively from appropriate emotions and that making rational statements may lower emotional distress in patients. Patients reiterating irrational statements showed no change in emotions, implying that these kinds of irrational cognitions may have already been present.
埃利斯的理性情绪理论假定,由于非理性陈述会加剧情绪困扰,用理性陈述取代非理性陈述应该会减轻困扰。在心理治疗的初始阶段对这一假设进行了检验,分别让13名和14名临床门诊患者针对其主要呈现的心理问题重复一分钟的理性或非理性陈述。还考察了埃利斯和哈珀(1975年)提出的“不适当”情绪与“适当”情绪在质上不同的观点。尽管实验干预对非理性信念的后测指标没有影响,但重复理性陈述的患者在后测时适当和不适当的负面情绪显著更低,这表明不适当情绪与适当情绪在质上没有差异,并且做出理性陈述可能会降低患者的情绪困扰。反复陈述非理性陈述的患者情绪没有变化,这意味着这类非理性认知可能已经存在。