Clement J P, McCue M J
Department of Health Administration, Medical College of Virginia, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond 23298-0203, USA.
Med Care. 1996 Jul;34(7):672-85. doi: 10.1097/00005650-199607000-00002.
The authors examine performance changes after two leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in the hospital industry, one an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) and the other a managed buyout (MBO). The findings show that hospitals owned by HCA, the MBO firm, and Health Trust, the ESOP firm, did not increase revenues, decrease operating expenses, or improve profitability after the LBOs, relative to other hospitals in their local markets. Nor were the numbers or salaries of employees at these facilities decreased. Although performance incentives associated with LBOs did not change performance at the hospital level, incentives to meet debt payments did result in corporate changes. More specifically, the LBOs led to corporate downsizing through the sale of hospitals and subsidiaries.
作者研究了医院行业两次杠杆收购(LBO)后的业绩变化,一次是员工持股计划(ESOP),另一次是管理层收购(MBO)。研究结果表明,与当地市场的其他医院相比,管理层收购公司HCA和员工持股计划公司Health Trust所拥有的医院在杠杆收购后并未增加收入、降低运营成本或提高盈利能力。这些机构的员工数量和薪资也没有减少。虽然与杠杆收购相关的业绩激励措施并未改变医院层面的业绩,但偿债激励措施确实导致了公司变革。更具体地说,杠杆收购通过出售医院和子公司导致了公司规模缩小。