Gaynor M
School of Hygiene and Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21205.
J Ment Health Adm. 1990 Fall;17(2):184-90. doi: 10.1007/BF02521147.
In an effort to contain costs and provide appropriate services, a growing number of states are experimenting with the terms of their fiscal transfers to localities. This paper contains an analysis of the economic incentives present in one such effort, the performance contract of the state of Montana. This contract contains incentives which do not fully support the attainment of a number of possible social goals, but these incentives could be strengthened by some simple amendments to the existing structure.
为了控制成本并提供适当的服务,越来越多的州正在试验其向地方进行财政转移支付的条款。本文对蒙大拿州的一项此类举措——绩效合同中的经济激励措施进行了分析。该合同中的激励措施并未完全支持实现一些可能的社会目标,但通过对现有结构进行一些简单修改,这些激励措施可以得到加强。