Feldstein P J
University of California, Irvine.
Q Rev Econ Bus. 1990 Winter;30(4):117-35.
This article uses a self-interest model to explain health care legislation. Seemingly uncoordinated, contradictory, inefficient, and inequitable legislative outcome are shown to be the result of a rational process in which the participants, including legislators, act according to their calculation of costs and benefits. Those groups able to offer political support receive net benefits at the expense of those who are less politically powerful. This framework is used to examine different types of health legislation with the emphasis on explicit redistributive policies such as Medicare and Medicaid.
本文运用自利模型来解释医疗保健立法。看似不协调、相互矛盾、低效且不公平的立法结果，实则是一个理性过程的产物，在此过程中，包括立法者在内的参与者依据自身对成本和收益的计算来行事。那些能够提供政治支持的群体以政治影响力较弱的群体为代价获得了净收益。这一框架被用于审视不同类型的医疗立法，重点关注诸如医疗保险和医疗补助等明确的再分配政策。
