Vita M G, Langenfeld J, Pautler P, Miller L
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
J Contemp Health Law Policy. 1991 Spring;7:73-115.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) has been very active in enforcing antitrust laws in the health care field for the past two decades. The staff has investigated a wide variety of cases covering a broad range of restrictions on competition. These cases can be divided into three basic types of cases in health care: (1) mergers and acquisitions, (2) horizontal restraints cases or agreements among competitors, and (3) input market monopolization cases, such as hospital privileges cases. The Commission relies on both legal and economic analysis in all of these cases. As Chairman Steiger of the Federal Trade Commission has stated, antitrust policy has been "increasingly reshaped by analysis based on economic theory." This article attempts to explain the economic analysis used in antitrust enforcement as applied to the first two of the three types of health care cases. Section I presents the basic economic framework that is used to assess the competitive implications of health care mergers and acquisitions. Section II describes the analysis applied to other agreements among competitors in the health care field and briefly explains how this analysis differs in other health care cases.
在过去二十年里,联邦贸易委员会(FTC或委员会)在医疗保健领域积极执行反垄断法。其工作人员调查了各种各样涉及广泛竞争限制的案件。这些案件可分为医疗保健领域的三种基本类型:(1)并购;(2)横向限制案件或竞争者之间的协议;(3)投入市场垄断案件,如医院特权案件。委员会在所有这些案件中都依赖法律和经济分析。正如联邦贸易委员会主席施泰格所说,反垄断政策“越来越多地通过基于经济理论的分析而重塑”。本文试图解释在反垄断执法中用于医疗保健三种类型案件中前两种案件的经济分析。第一节介绍用于评估医疗保健并购竞争影响的基本经济框架。第二节描述应用于医疗保健领域其他竞争者之间协议的分析,并简要解释这种分析在其他医疗保健案件中有何不同。