Sarath B
University of Pennsylvania.
Rand J Econ. 1991 Summer;22(2):218-31.
Legal penalties and liability insurance seem to have counteracting effects on the incentives of a potential injurer to take due care. However, if legal penalties are set efficiently and implemented perfectly, unrestricted access to insurance can be optimal. In contract, if the standards of guilt assessment are uncertain, the size of the legal penalties may act as a spur to litigation. Therefore, the penalties required to maintain incentives when access to insurance is unlimited may provoke too much litigation, and as a consequence, the costs of ensuring due care may decline when insurance is restricted by mandate.
法律惩罚和责任保险似乎对潜在侵权人采取应有关注措施的激励产生抵消作用。然而，如果法律惩罚设定合理且执行完美，不受限制的保险获取可能是最优的。相反，如果罪责评估标准不确定，法律惩罚的规模可能会刺激诉讼。因此，在保险获取不受限制时为维持激励所需的惩罚可能会引发过多诉讼，结果是，当保险因强制规定而受到限制时，确保应有关注的成本可能会下降。
