Botz C K
St. Joseph Health Centre, London, Ontario.
Healthc Manage Forum. 1991 Winter;4(4):22-32. doi: 10.1016/S0840-4704(10)61307-5.
The construct of Resource Intensity Weights (RIWs) contains implicit financial incentives if they are used for hospital funding purposes. This paper compares the RIW (funding) credit to the expected average per diem cost for each of the new subcategories (typicals, deaths, transfers, signouts and outliers) of Case Mix Groups (CMGs). RIW construction, and inherent incentives for a hospital to reduce costs or length of stay (LOS), differ significantly for each subcategory. At some point or points in a patient's LOS, when RIW credit equals case cost, RIWs are incentive neutral. However, it can also be demonstrated that RIW credit is not generally congruent with average costs on each day of a patient's stay. Financial incentives (both positive and negative) arise when RIW credit and costs differ. Only by being fully aware of these differences can hospitals determine how to respond to the introduction of case mix funding to maintain financial viability. Funding agencies, too, need to appreciate the sometimes subtle policy implications that come with the adoption of RIWs for funding purposes.
如果将资源强度权重(RIWs)用于医院资金分配目的,那么其构建中就包含了隐性的财务激励措施。本文将RIW(资金分配)信贷与病例组合分组(CMGs)中每个新子类别(典型病例、死亡病例、转院病例、交班病例和异常病例)的预期日均成本进行了比较。RIW的构建以及医院降低成本或缩短住院时间(LOS)的内在激励措施,在每个子类别中都存在显著差异。在患者住院期间的某些时间点,当RIW信贷等于病例成本时,RIWs处于激励中性状态。然而,也可以证明,RIW信贷通常与患者住院期间每天的平均成本并不一致。当RIW信贷与成本不同时,就会产生财务激励(包括正向和负向)。只有充分意识到这些差异,医院才能确定如何应对病例组合资金分配的引入以维持财务生存能力。资金分配机构也需要认识到,将RIWs用于资金分配目的时可能会带来的一些微妙的政策影响。