Marquis M S
RAND Corporation, Washington, DC.
J Health Econ. 1992 Aug;11(2):129-51. doi: 10.1016/0167-6296(92)90031-u.
This study uses simulation methods to quantify the effects of adverse selection. The data used to develop the model provide information about whether families can accurately forecast their risk and whether this forecast affects the purchase of insurance coverage--key conditions for adverse selection to matter. The results suggest that adverse selection is sufficient to eliminate high-option benefit plans in multiple choice markets if insurers charge a single, experience-rated premium. Adverse selection is substantially reduced if premiums are varied according to demographic factors. Adverse selection is also restricted in supplementary insurance markets. In this market, supplementary policies are underpriced because a part of the additional benefits that purchasers can expect is a cost to the base plan and is not reflected in the supplementary premium. As a result, full supplementary coverage is attractive to both low and high risks.
本研究采用模拟方法来量化逆向选择的影响。用于建立模型的数据提供了有关家庭是否能够准确预测其风险以及该预测是否会影响保险覆盖范围购买的信息——这是逆向选择产生影响的关键条件。结果表明，如果保险公司收取单一的经验费率保费，逆向选择足以在多选市场中消除高选项福利计划。如果根据人口因素调整保费，逆向选择会大幅减少。逆向选择在补充保险市场中也受到限制。在这个市场中，补充政策定价过低，因为购买者预期的部分额外福利是基础计划的成本，且未反映在补充保费中。因此，全额补充保险对低风险和高风险人群都有吸引力。
