Price J R, Mays J W
Inquiry. 1985 Spring;22(1):67-77.
The existence of biased selection in health insurance markets has long been assumed by economic theorists as well as seen between classes of health plans. In this paper, we use a model of the premium rate that takes into consideration the effects of moral hazard to make empirical estimates of the extent of selection in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. We find that biased selection has raised the premium of the Blue Cross Plan high-option coverage by 21% and lowered the premium of the low-option coverage by 29%, both relative to premiums that would have been charged in the absence of selection.
长期以来，经济理论家一直假定健康保险市场存在偏向性选择，而且在不同类别的健康保险计划之间也能看到这种现象。在本文中，我们使用一个考虑了道德风险影响的保险费率模型，对联邦雇员健康福利计划中的选择程度进行实证估计。我们发现，相对于在不存在选择的情况下本应收取的保费，偏向性选择使蓝十字计划高选项保险的保费提高了21%，并使低选项保险的保费降低了29%。
