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美国医院之间的竞争。

Competition among hospitals in the United States.

作者信息

Thomson R B

机构信息

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Ontario.

出版信息

Health Policy. 1994 Mar;27(3):205-31. doi: 10.1016/0168-8510(94)90117-1.

Abstract

The value added by acute-care hospitals is in the form of specific procedures (therapy, operations, testing) and the bed care necessary to make the procedures effective. When more than one hospital exists in a local area (defined in many studies as a radius of 15 mi/24 km) they compete for market share, since greater market share has a positive effect on economies of scale, utilization rates, learning curves and levels of quality. Competition is not only with other hospitals (and 75% of all hospitals do have a competitor within 24 km), but also with doctors who now perform some procedures in their offices, and with specialized clinics. The first strategy is to attract physician allegiance since they act as gate-keepers, directing patients to specific hospitals. This is done through personal amenities, professional amenities and enhancement to personal prestige and income. This competition for physician allegiance has a direct effect on utilization rates (doctors want spare capacity to suit their needs), on the range of services and facilities offered (doctors want more support), and on length of stay (doctors want longer stays). All of these increase the hospital's costs. The second strategy is to enter into contracts with third-party payers who will direct their clients to specific or preferred hospitals. The negative effect is that in competitive markets such payers may be able to bargain prices down. However, hospital differentiation makes it difficult for payers to make complete substitutions among them. As well, since the payers compete for clients, they often use hospital alliances as a selling point and therefore are often cooperative rather than confrontational in their negotiations. One tactic used by hospitals is to stress quality of service. But since quality in health care is hard to measure, patients are often unable to make direct assessments of alternatives. Hospitals therefore often 'signal' quality in various ways which may, and often do, increase hospital costs. (Some of these signals also attract physicians). Price is not a major element in competition. Most other strategies and tactics raise hospital costs and therefore price. Pressure from payers is turned back through differentiation (preventing substitution) and hospital-payer alliances for clients. Health care comes in too many packages to allow effective price competition. A final tactic is to increase the range of services or facilities offered. Enhanced services attract doctors by offering more support; attract some patients direct; and help to recapture market share lost to specialized clinics.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)

摘要

急症医院提供的附加值体现在特定程序(治疗、手术、检测)以及使这些程序有效的床位护理上。当当地存在多家医院时(在许多研究中定义为半径15英里/24公里的区域),它们会争夺市场份额,因为更大的市场份额对规模经济、利用率、学习曲线和质量水平具有积极影响。竞争不仅来自其他医院(75%的医院在24公里范围内确实有竞争对手),还来自现在在其办公室进行一些程序的医生以及专科诊所。第一种策略是吸引医生的忠诚,因为他们是把关人,将患者引导至特定医院。这通过个人便利设施、专业便利设施以及提升个人威望和收入来实现。这种对医生忠诚的竞争对利用率(医生希望有备用容量以满足他们的需求)、提供的服务和设施范围(医生希望得到更多支持)以及住院时间(医生希望住院时间更长)都有直接影响。所有这些都会增加医院的成本。第二种策略是与第三方支付者签订合同,这些支付者会将他们的客户引导至特定或首选医院。负面影响是在竞争激烈的市场中,此类支付者可能能够压低价格。然而,医院的差异化使得支付者难以在它们之间进行完全替代。此外,由于支付者争夺客户,他们经常将医院联盟作为一个卖点,因此在谈判中往往是合作而非对抗的。医院使用的一种策略是强调服务质量。但由于医疗保健中的质量难以衡量,患者往往无法对替代方案进行直接评估。因此,医院经常以各种方式“表明”质量,这可能而且经常会增加医院成本。(其中一些信号也会吸引医生)价格并非竞争的主要因素。大多数其他策略和战术会增加医院成本,进而提高价格。通过差异化(防止替代)和医院与支付者为争夺客户而结成的联盟,支付者的压力得以缓解。医疗保健有太多套餐形式,无法进行有效的价格竞争。最后一种策略是增加提供的服务或设施范围。增强的服务通过提供更多支持来吸引医生;直接吸引一些患者;并有助于夺回被专科诊所夺走的市场份额。(摘要截取自400字)

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