Jacobson C K
Arizona State University.
Acad Manage J. 1994 Apr;37(2):440-52.
Two failed congressional attempts to control escalating health costs are examined. The data show that investors apparently anticipated their failure. With the implementation of a policy encouraging market competition, however, investors expected larger firms to benefit and firms with previously high profit growth rates to lose. From the viewpoint of the politics of structural choice, it appears that identifiable structural flaws were deliberately designed into both laws in ways that would promote failure and protect key interest groups.
本文考察了国会两次控制不断攀升的医疗成本但未成功的尝试。数据显示，投资者显然预料到了这些尝试会失败。然而，随着一项鼓励市场竞争政策的实施，投资者预计大公司将受益，而此前利润率高的公司将受损。从结构选择政治的角度来看，这两项法律似乎都故意设计了明显的结构缺陷，以促成失败并保护关键利益集团。
