Neudeck W, Podczeck K
Johns Hopkins University, SAIS Bologna Center, Italy.
J Health Econ. 1996 Aug;15(4):387-408. doi: 10.1016/s0167-6296(96)00488-2.
In this paper we look at various ways to regulate the health insurance market and ask whether they provide an answer to the problem of adverse selection. To avoid inefficiency, government policy must either effectuate some cross-subsidization of insurance policies within the state sector or grant private insurance firms an exclusive right to serve certain groups of the population. Recent reforms in the Netherlands and Germany and President Clinton's proposals for the US could be adapted to fulfil these requirements. Efficiency cannot be achieved, on the other hand, if the regulator tries to "prescribe" cross-subsidization within the private sector.
在本文中，我们探讨了规范健康保险市场的各种方式，并询问它们是否能解决逆向选择问题。为避免效率低下，政府政策必须要么在国有部门内实现某种保险政策的交叉补贴，要么授予私人保险公司服务特定人群的专有权。荷兰和德国最近的改革以及克林顿总统对美国的提议可以加以调整以满足这些要求。另一方面，如果监管机构试图在私营部门“规定”交叉补贴，就无法实现效率。
