Josephson G W, Karcz A
Columbia MetroWest Medical Center, Framingham, MA 01701, USA.
Am J Manag Care. 1997 Jan;3(1):49-56.
The utilization of financial incentives to limit the use of health resources by primary care physicians represents a common reimbursement strategy by managed care organizations. These arrangements are virtually nonexistent with indemnity insurance. This analysis compares the hospitalization rates of patients with low-acuity medical conditions--ambulatory sensitive conditions (ASCs)--among three groups receiving care from primary care physicians. The physicians were compensated under different reimbursement mechanisms, in which incentives for reduced resource utilization varied. The groups can be described as follows: (1) a capitated for-profit group practice in which the physician partners have a relatively high economic incentive for lower utilization (group I); (2) physicians providing care under the auspices of three separate independent practice associations, in which the associations are capitated but the physicians are paid on a discounted fee-for-service basis (the associations also were included in this group) (group II); and (3) physicians who service patients whose care continues to be paid for by traditional indemnity insurance (group III). Financial incentives in the third group cohort were believed to be low to intermediate, and the physicians were assumed to have had no economic incentives to restrain their use of healthcare resources. Additional data analysis examined the role of emergency department utilization among patients in the groups. Group I patients ages 25 to 44 were admitted for ambulatory sensitive conditions at a significantly lower rate than were patients in groups II or III--0.8/1,000, 2.7/1,000, and 2.9/1,000, respectively. No difference was apparent in admission rates between patients in groups II and III. Overall emergency department utilization rates were lowest in the group I capitated panel (70/1,000), much higher in the group II independent practice association panel (363/1,000) and highest in the group III indemnity panel (466/1,000). Each of these rates was significantly different from the other. Both the ED utilization rate and ambulatory sensitive condition admission rate may have been affected by differences in socioeconomic status among the patient panels in the three groups. The overall effect of this variable on the two admission rates could not be isolated.
利用经济激励措施来限制初级保健医生对卫生资源的使用,这是管理式医疗组织常用的一种报销策略。而在传统的赔偿保险中,这种安排几乎不存在。本分析比较了三组由初级保健医生诊治的低 acuity 医疗状况患者(门诊敏感疾病患者,简称 ASCs)的住院率。这些医生按照不同的报销机制获得报酬,其中对减少资源使用的激励措施各不相同。这三组情况如下:(1)一个按人头付费的营利性团体医疗模式,其中医生合伙人有相对较高的经济激励来降低资源使用(第一组);(2)在三个独立的独立执业协会的支持下提供医疗服务的医生,协会按人头付费,但医生按折扣后的服务收费制获得报酬(协会也包含在该组中)(第二组);(3)为继续由传统赔偿保险支付医疗费用的患者提供服务的医生(第三组)。第三组队列中的经济激励被认为处于低到中等水平,并且假定医生没有经济激励来限制其对医疗资源的使用。额外的数据分析考察了这些组中患者对急诊科的使用情况。25 至 44 岁的第一组患者因门诊敏感疾病住院的比例显著低于第二组或第三组患者,分别为 0.8/1000、2.7/1000 和 2.9/1000。第二组和第三组患者的住院率没有明显差异。第一组按人头付费的患者群体中,急诊科总体使用率最低(70/1000),第二组独立执业协会患者群体中高得多(363/1000),第三组赔偿保险患者群体中最高(466/1000)。这些比率中的每一个都与其他比率有显著差异。急诊科使用率和门诊敏感疾病住院率可能都受到了三组患者群体社会经济状况差异的影响。该变量对这两种住院率的总体影响无法单独分离出来。