Mueser P R, Cowan N, Mueser K T
Department of Economics, University of Missouri, Columbia 65211, USA.
Cognition. 1999 Jan 1;69(3):267-312. doi: 10.1016/s0010-0277(98)00072-9.
The predominant models of rational behavior currently used to analyze a large class of experiments imply that subjects neglect or place insufficient weight on base rates when making probabilistic judgments. We argue that the evidence is inadequate for this conclusion because the models make needlessly restrictive assumptions about how base rates should be used. The restrictive assumptions stem from a misuse of Bayes' rule that ignores specific aspects of how the proportions arose. We develop a model of rational behavior that generalizes signal detection theory to reflect the environment subjects routinely face and we reexamine the relevant experimental literature. Variation observed in subjects' responses to base rate information is explained by the present rational model more fully than by extant models.
当前用于分析大量实验的主要理性行为模型表明，受试者在进行概率判断时会忽略基本概率或对其重视不足。我们认为，这一结论的证据并不充分，因为这些模型对基本概率的使用方式做出了不必要的限制性假设。这些限制性假设源于对贝叶斯法则的误用，该误用忽略了比例产生方式的具体方面。我们开发了一种理性行为模型，该模型将信号检测理论进行了推广，以反映受试者通常面临的环境，并重新审视了相关的实验文献。与现有模型相比，当前的理性模型更全面地解释了在受试者对基本概率信息的反应中观察到的差异。
