Long H W
Physician Exec. 1989 Jan-Feb;15(1):41-2.
In a prior column (Long, H., "Group Practices May Ignore Economic Realities: Commingling of Rents and Returns," Physician Executive 14(5):33-35, Sept.-Oct. 1988), the author discussed the tendency of many group practices to ignore ordinary business economics. The examples discussed in that column was the inappropriate commingling of rents and returns from the various factors of production in medical practice. A frequent result of this is physicians who also have ownership interests and/or managerial responsibilities having an inflated perception of their worth as physicians because they are undercompensated for their ownership/management roles. In this column, the author addresses the inadvertent structuring of physician remuneration via income distribution or externally negotiated formulas that reward individual behavior that actually threatens the economic viability of the group.
在之前的一篇专栏文章中(朗,H.,“集团执业可能忽视经济现实:租金与回报的混合”,《医师执行官》14(5):33 - 35,1988年9 - 10月),作者讨论了许多集团执业忽视普通商业经济学的倾向。该专栏中讨论的例子是医疗执业中租金与各种生产要素回报的不当混合。这种情况经常导致那些同时拥有所有权权益和/或管理职责的医生,因他们在所有权/管理角色上未得到充分补偿,而对自己作为医生的价值有过高认知。在本专栏中,作者探讨了通过收入分配或外部协商公式对医生薪酬进行无意的结构安排,这些公式奖励的个人行为实际上威胁到了集团的经济可行性。