Alpers A, Lo B
Program in Medical Ethics, University of California, San Francisco, USA.
Arch Fam Med. 1999 May-Jun;8(3):200-5. doi: 10.1001/archfami.8.3.200.
In June 1997, the US Supreme Court unanimously decided that competent, terminally ill patients have no general constitutional right to commit suicide or to obtain assistance in committing suicide. Thus, the broad prohibitions against any kind of suicide assistance that almost every state has enacted do not violate the constitution. While many of the rulings and the bulk of the reaction to them focused on the Supreme Court's resolution of important legal controversies regarding physician-assisted suicide, this article focuses on the resulting potential for change in physicians' opinions on palliative care. The Court's reasoning may help physicians resolve substantial ethical dilemmas regarding the provision of narcotics given in high dosages, the care of incompetent patients, and the suffering caused by symptoms other than pain. For example, the Court concluded that a physician's intent can distinguish permissible acts of aggressive pain relief from impermissible acts of hastening death. This distinction has clinical uses and can help physicians develop ethical guidelines and practice standards to improve palliative care near the end of life.
1997年6月,美国最高法院一致裁定,有行为能力的晚期患者没有普遍的宪法权利自杀或寻求自杀帮助。因此,几乎每个州颁布的对任何形式自杀帮助的广泛禁令并不违反宪法。虽然许多裁决以及对这些裁决的大部分反应都集中在最高法院对医生协助自杀这一重要法律争议的裁决上,但本文关注的是这一裁决可能导致医生对姑息治疗看法的潜在变化。最高法院的推理可能有助于医生解决在提供高剂量麻醉药品、照顾无行为能力患者以及疼痛以外症状所导致的痛苦等方面的重大伦理困境。例如,最高法院得出结论,医生的意图可以区分积极缓解疼痛的可允许行为和加速死亡的不可允许行为。这种区分具有临床用途,可以帮助医生制定伦理准则和实践标准,以改善临终时的姑息治疗。