Gold I
Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3168, Australia.
Conscious Cogn. 2001 Mar;10(1):59-62; discussion, 146-56. doi: 10.1006/ccog.2000.0474.
Ross argues that the location problem for color-the problem of how it is represented as occupying a particular location in space-constitutes an objection to color subjectivism. There are two ways in which the location problem can be interpreted. First, it can be read as a why-question about the relation of visual experience to the environment represented: Why does visual experience represent a patch of color as located in this part of space rather than that? On this interpretation, the subjectivist can answer Ross's objection by appealing to the physical location of reflectance rather than color. Second, it can be read as a how-question about visual representation itself: How does visual experience put together the experience of a color with the experience of its being located in space? This version makes the location problem a problem about visual experience itself and renders the ontology of color irrelevant to its solution. The location problem is thus no more a problem for the color subjectivist than for the color realist.
罗斯认为,颜色的位置问题——即颜色如何被表征为占据空间中的特定位置这一问题——构成了对颜色主观主义的一种反驳。位置问题有两种解释方式。首先,它可以被解读为一个关于视觉体验与所表征环境之间关系的“为什么”问题:为什么视觉体验将一块颜色表征为位于空间的这一部分而不是那一部分?按照这种解释,主观主义者可以通过诉诸反射率的物理位置而非颜色来回应罗斯的反驳。其次,它可以被解读为一个关于视觉表征本身的“如何”问题:视觉体验是如何将颜色体验与其在空间中的位置体验结合在一起的?这个版本使位置问题成为了一个关于视觉体验本身的问题,并使得颜色的本体论与解决该问题无关。因此,位置问题对于颜色主观主义者来说并不比对颜色实在论者来说更是一个问题。