Krakauer D C
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, Olden Lane, NJ 08540, USA.
J Theor Biol. 2001 Nov 21;213(2):145-57. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2408.
A distinctive feature of all human languages is the diverse and arbitrary nature of the sign (signifier). This can be interpreted as stating that the mapping between signals and referents is established by convention rather than by functional constraints. This property of the sign provides for a great deal of linguistic flexibility and is a key component of symbolic communication. Game theoretic models to describe signal imitation are investigated with a view to understanding how non-arbitrary (indexical) animal-style signals might 'evolve' culturally into diverse, arbitrary signs. I explore the evolutionary hypothesis that private, arbitrary signs emerge as a result of selective imitation within a socially structured population. Once arbitrary signs have emerged, they contribute towards greater assortative interactions among individuals using a shared sign system. In natural populations, the models for imitation will very often be close kin. Hence, kinship provides one mechanism for the creation of true symbols. An imitation-structured population can support many more sign systems than an equivalent non-structured population and is one in which symbols become the dominant force in assortative interactions.
所有人类语言的一个显著特征是符号（能指）的多样性和任意性。这可以解释为信号与所指之间的映射是由约定俗成而非功能限制所确立的。符号的这一特性赋予了语言极大的灵活性，并且是符号交流的关键组成部分。为了理解非任意性（指示性）的动物式信号如何在文化上“进化”为多样的、任意的符号，我们研究了用于描述信号模仿的博弈论模型。我探讨了一种进化假说，即私密的、任意的符号是在社会结构化群体中的选择性模仿的结果。一旦任意符号出现，它们会促进使用共享符号系统的个体之间更多的同类互动。在自然群体中，模仿模型通常是近亲。因此，亲属关系为真正符号的产生提供了一种机制。一个由模仿构建的群体比同等的非结构化群体能够支持更多的符号系统，并且在这个群体中，符号成为同类互动中的主导力量。
