Fishman Michael A, Stone Lewi, Lotem Arnon
Department of Zoology, Faculty of Life Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel.
J Theor Biol. 2003 Mar 7;221(1):103-14. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2003.3174.
Extrapair paternity has been observed in many formally monogamous species. Male pursuit of extrapair fertilizations is explained by the advantages of having offspring that receive essential paternal care from other males. Since females are capable of exercising a degree of control over the post-copulatory sperm competition, extrapair paternity cannot persist unless it confers fitness benefits on cuckolding females. Thus, extrapair paternity involves cooperation between mated females and extrapair males. On the other hand, paired males frequently exhibit strategies that minimize their loss of paternity and/or conserve paternal investment if paternity is lost. Hence, extrapair attributes of diverse species and populations reported in the literature are particular solutions of evolutionary games involving gender-specific cuckolding/anti-cuckolding strategies. Here we use methods of evolutionary game theory to study the role of male paternity guarding strategies in situations where females seek extrapair fertilizations for reasons of genetic compatibility and/or in pursuit of genetic diversity for their offspring. Our results indicate that in these circumstances pursuit of extrapair fertilizations is the only evolutionary stable female strategy. Males, on the other hand, have two, mutually exclusive, evolutionary stable strategies: full time pursuit of extrapair fertilizations and a compromise strategy wherein they protect in-pair paternity during their mate's fertile periods and pursue extrapair paternity the rest of the time. The relative merits of these two strategies are determined by the efficiency of male in-pair paternity defense, breeding synchrony, fitness advantages of extrapair over in-pair offspring, and the intensity of competition for extrapair fertilizations from floater males.
在许多形式上为一夫一妻制的物种中都观察到了配偶外父权现象。雄性对配偶外受精的追求可以通过拥有能从其他雄性那里获得必要父性照料的后代所带来的优势来解释。由于雌性能够在交配后的精子竞争中行使一定程度的控制权,所以除非配偶外父权能给被戴绿帽的雌性带来适应性益处,否则它就无法持续存在。因此,配偶外父权涉及已配对雌性与配偶外雄性之间的合作。另一方面,已配对的雄性经常会表现出一些策略,这些策略能将其亲权损失降到最低,和/或在失去亲权的情况下保留父性投资。因此,文献中报道的不同物种和种群的配偶外属性是涉及特定性别戴绿帽/反戴绿帽策略的进化博弈的特殊解决方案。在此,我们运用进化博弈论方法来研究雄性亲权守护策略在雌性因基因相容性原因寻求配偶外受精和/或为其后代追求基因多样性的情况下所起的作用。我们的结果表明,在这些情况下,追求配偶外受精是唯一的进化稳定雌性策略。另一方面,雄性有两种相互排斥的进化稳定策略:全职追求配偶外受精以及一种折衷策略,即在其配偶的排卵期保护配偶内亲权,其余时间追求配偶外父权。这两种策略的相对优势由雄性配偶内亲权防御的效率、繁殖同步性、配偶外后代相对于配偶内后代的适应性优势以及来自流浪雄性对配偶外受精的竞争强度所决定。