Tullberg Jan
Stockholm School of Economics, PO Box 6501, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden.
J Theor Biol. 2003 Oct 21;224(4):469-78. doi: 10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00194-2.
This article penetrates the relationship between social behavior and rationality. A critical analysis is made of efforts to classify some behaviors as altruistic, as they simultaneously meet criteria of rationality by not truly being self-destructive. Newcomb's paradox is one attempt to create a hybrid behavior that is both irrational and still meets some criterion of rationality. Such dubious rationality is often seen as a source of altruistic behavior. Group selection is a controversial topic. Sober and Wilson (Unto Others--The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998) suggest that a very wide concept of group selection might be used to explain altruism. This concept also includes kin selection and reciprocity, which blurs its focus. The latter mechanisms hardly need further arguments to prove their existence. This article suggests that it is group selection in a strict sense that should be investigated to limit semantic neologism and confusion. In evaluation, the effort to muster a mechanism for altruism out of group selection has not been successful. However, this is not the end to group selection, but rather a good reason to investigate more promising possibilities. There is little reason to burden group selection with the instability of altruism caused by altruistic members of a group having lower fitness than egoistic members. Group selection is much more likely to develop in combination with group egoism. A common project is supported by incitement against free riding, where conformist members joined in solidarity achieve a higher fitness than members pursuing more individualistic options. Group egoism is in no conflict with rationality, and the effects of group selection will be supported rather than threatened by individual selection. Empirical evidence indicates a high level of traits such as conformism and out-group antagonism in line with group egoism. These traits are also likely candidates for behavior favored by group selection since they homogenize the group and link the different individuals closer to one another and a similar fate.
本文深入探讨了社会行为与理性之间的关系。对将某些行为归类为利他行为的努力进行了批判性分析，因为这些行为同时通过并非真正自我毁灭而符合理性标准。纽科姆悖论是创造一种既不理性又仍符合某种理性标准的混合行为的一次尝试。这种可疑的理性常被视为利他行为的一个来源。群体选择是一个有争议的话题。索伯和威尔逊（《为他人——无私行为的进化与心理学》，哈佛大学出版社，马萨诸塞州剑桥，1998年）认为，一个非常宽泛的群体选择概念或许可用于解释利他主义。这个概念还包括亲缘选择和互惠，这模糊了其重点。后两种机制几乎无需进一步论证来证明其存在。本文认为，应研究严格意义上的群体选择，以限制语义新词和混淆。在评估中，从群体选择中找出一种利他主义机制的努力并未成功。然而，这并非群体选择的终点，而是研究更有前景可能性的一个好理由。没有理由因群体中利他成员的适应性低于利己成员而导致利他主义不稳定，从而给群体选择带来负担。群体选择更有可能与群体利己主义相结合而发展。一个共同项目通过对搭便车行为的抵制而得到支持，在此过程中，团结起来的从众成员比追求更个人主义选择的成员具有更高的适应性。群体利己主义与理性并不冲突，群体选择的效果将得到个体选择的支持而非威胁。经验证据表明，从众和群体外对抗等特征高度符合群体利己主义。这些特征也很可能是群体选择所青睐行为的候选者，因为它们使群体同质化，并使不同个体彼此联系更紧密以及命运更相似。
