Huxsoll D L
School of Veterinary Medicine, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge 70803-8402.
Ann N Y Acad Sci. 1992 Dec 31;666:177-90. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.1992.tb38029.x.
Although "research" is not prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention, States Parties to the Convention have maintained the spirit of the Convention in actions relating to research. The confidence-building measures agreed to at RC2 refer to research facilities, publication of research results, and promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in research related to the Convention. However, assessment of basic research on biological agents is not a productive way to distinguish an offensive from a defensive program. Additionally, if a country were to initiate a biological weapons program, basic research on biological agents may not be necessary. For example, the extensive published research on Bacillus anthracis, both as a cause of anthrax in cattle and other species and as a biological-warfare agent, would enable any motivated group or nation to initiate a biological weapons program that could immediately advance to the development and scale-up stages. Research on biological agents for offensive purposes would be characterized by activities such as selection for growth, virulence, and toxin production; improving stability under varying environmental conditions; and selection of strains that might overcome existing means of prophylaxis and treatment. A biological program with an offensive intent would in most cases be characterized by evidence of development efforts in mass production and dissemination, which are often agent-specific. Thus, an assessment of development may distinguish offensive from defensive programs. If a country were to initiate a biological weapons research program, and were willing to risk worldwide condemnation should existence of such a program become known, it is likely that such a program would include development and production capabilities. If a country were not committed to production capability, there would be no rationale for an offensive biological research that would bring worldwide condemnation. Critics of the U.S. Biological Defense Research Program have suggested that the program could easily and quickly be turned into an offensive effort. To accomplish this, however, we have to assume that all military personnel, including the civilians employed by the Department of the Army, are unethical and willing to break the law and run the risk of placing the U.S. in a noncompliance status. The Army is under constant scrutiny by governmental agencies, by visiting scientists, by audiences at scientific meetings, by scientists who review manuscripts for publications, by news media, and by private citizens.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)
虽然《生物武器公约》并不禁止“研究”，但公约缔约国在与研究相关的行动中始终秉持着公约的精神。第二次审查会议商定的建立信任措施涉及研究设施、研究成果的公布以及促进从事与公约相关研究的科学家之间的交流。然而，对生物制剂的基础研究评估并非区分进攻性计划和防御性计划的有效方式。此外，如果一个国家要启动生物武器计划，可能并不一定需要对生物制剂进行基础研究。例如，关于炭疽杆菌的大量已发表研究，既涉及它作为牛和其他物种炭疽病病因的研究，也涉及它作为生物战剂的研究，这会使任何有动机的团体或国家能够启动一个生物武器计划，并能立即推进到开发和扩大规模阶段。用于进攻目的的生物制剂研究的特点是进行诸如选择生长特性、毒力和毒素产生能力的研究；提高在不同环境条件下的稳定性；以及选择可能克服现有预防和治疗手段的菌株等活动。大多数情况下，具有进攻意图的生物计划会有大规模生产和传播方面的开发努力的证据，这些往往因制剂而异。因此，对开发情况的评估可能有助于区分进攻性计划和防御性计划。如果一个国家要启动生物武器研究计划，并且愿意承担一旦该计划被知晓就会面临全球谴责的风险，那么这样一个计划很可能会包括开发和生产能力。如果一个国家不致力于生产能力，那么就没有理由开展会招致全球谴责的进攻性生物研究。美国生物防御研究计划的批评者认为该计划可以轻易且迅速地转变为进攻性行动。然而，要做到这一点，我们必须假定所有军事人员，包括陆军部雇佣的文职人员，都是不道德的，并且愿意违法并冒使美国处于不履约状态的风险。陆军受到政府机构、来访科学家、科学会议的听众、审阅稿件以供发表的科学家、新闻媒体以及普通公民的持续监督。（摘要截选至400词）
