Paterson Craig
Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island, USA.
Stud Christ Ethics. 2003;16(2):1-20. doi: 10.1177/095394680301600201.
The work of Dan Brock and Helga Kuhse is typical of the current stream of thought rejecting the validity of sanctity of life appeals to instill objective inviolable worth in human life regardless of the quality of life of the patient. The context of a person's life is supremely important. In their systems life can have high value, yet the value of life can be outweighed by the force of other disvalues. The notion of quality of life has increasingly come to signify the measurement of the worth of a person's life itself. Having a life equals a personal life. Any objectivity to life resides in 'personal', 'biographical', or 'creative' life, not mere biological life. Personal life represents the minimal threshold for any objective worth. In responding to this challenge, John Finnis has argued extensively that life is an intrinsic good--a basic human good. Following from our grasp of human life as a basic incommensurable good, it cannot be practically reasonable both to affirm that (a) 'human life is a basic human good', and (b) that 'human life qua human life can be intentionally acted against to its destruction'. Yet, if the good of human life can be considered self-evident, the self-evidence of the basic human good qua good does not mean that dialectical reasoning cannot be engaged in to indirectly support the practical reasonableness of respecting the good of human life in the deliberative choices that persons make concerning their actions. It is to the use of such dialectical reasoning, supportive of the status of human life as such a basic human good, that the article is primarily concerned to draw out and articulate.
丹·布罗克（Dan Brock）和赫尔加·库泽（Helga Kuhse）的作品代表了当前的思潮，这种思潮拒绝生命神圣性诉求的有效性，即不顾患者的生活质量而赋予人类生命客观的、不可侵犯的价值。一个人生活的背景极其重要。在他们的体系中，生命可以具有很高的价值，但生命的价值可能会被其他负面价值的力量所超越。生活质量的概念越来越多地意味着对一个人生命本身价值的衡量。拥有生命等同于拥有个人生活。生命的任何客观性都存在于“个人”、“传记”或“创造性”的生活中，而不仅仅是生物性的生命。个人生活代表了任何客观价值的最低门槛。为了应对这一挑战，约翰·菲尼斯（John Finnis）广泛论证了生命是一种内在善——一种基本的人类善。基于我们将人类生命理解为一种基本的不可通约的善，既断言（a）“人类生命是一种基本的人类善”，又断言（b）“作为人类生命的人类生命可以被有意地违背直至毁灭”，这在实践中是不合理的。然而，如果人类生命之善可以被视为不证自明的，基本人类善作为善的不证自明并不意味着不能进行辩证推理，以间接支持在人们关于自身行为的审慎选择中尊重人类生命之善的实践合理性。本文主要关注的是引出并阐明这种支持人类生命作为一种基本人类善地位的辩证推理的运用。
