Kaplan Edward H
Yale School of Management and the Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8200, USA.
Epidemiology. 2004 May;15(3):264-70. doi: 10.1097/01.ede.0000121821.02642.a4.
This article presents a new probabilistic model for the prevention of second-generation infections by different vaccination strategies in the event of a smallpox bioterror attack. The main results are independent of the reproductive number R0 (the number of secondary infections transmitted per index infected individual) and population mixing patterns. General expressions are derived for the fraction of second-generation infections that can be prevented through vaccination, whereas specific results are obtained for traced and mass vaccination, respectively. Expressions for total outbreak size in controlled epidemics are also presented. The analysis highlights the importance of vaccination logistics in addition to beliefs and assumptions regarding smallpox epidemiology in evaluating alternative responses to a smallpox bioterror attack.
本文提出了一种新的概率模型，用于在天花生物恐怖袭击事件中通过不同的疫苗接种策略预防二代感染。主要结果与再生数R0（每个指数感染个体传播的二代感染数）和人群混合模式无关。推导了通过疫苗接种可预防的二代感染比例的一般表达式，同时分别得到了追踪接种和大规模接种的具体结果。还给出了受控疫情中总爆发规模的表达式。分析强调了在评估应对天花生物恐怖袭击的替代措施时，除了关于天花流行病学的信念和假设外，疫苗接种后勤工作的重要性。
