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互利共生的进化稳定性:种间种群调节作为一种进化稳定策略。

Evolutionary stability of mutualism: interspecific population regulation as an evolutionarily stable strategy.

作者信息

Holland J Nathaniel, DeAngelis Donald L, Schultz Stewart T

机构信息

Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Rice University, MS 170, 6100 South Main Street, Houston, TX 77005-1892, USA.

出版信息

Proc Biol Sci. 2004 Sep 7;271(1550):1807-14. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2004.2789.

Abstract

Interspecific mutualisms are often vulnerable to instability because low benefit : cost ratios can rapidly lead to extinction or to the conversion of mutualism to parasite-host or predator-prey interactions. We hypothesize that the evolutionary stability of mutualism can depend on how benefits and costs to one mutualist vary with the population density of its partner, and that stability can be maintained if a mutualist can influence demographic rates and regulate the population density of its partner. We test this hypothesis in a model of mutualism with key features of senita cactus (Pachycereus schottii)-senita moth (Upiga virescens) interactions, in which benefits of pollination and costs of larval seed consumption to plant fitness depend on pollinator density. We show that plants can maximize their fitness by allocating resources to the production of excess flowers at the expense of fruit. Fruit abortion resulting from excess flower production reduces pre-adult survival of the pollinating seed-consumer, and maintains its density beneath a threshold that would destabilize the mutualism. Such a strategy of excess flower production and fruit abortion is convergent and evolutionarily stable against invasion by cheater plants that produce few flowers and abort few to no fruit. This novel mechanism of achieving evolutionarily stable mutualism, namely interspecific population regulation, is qualitatively different from other mechanisms invoking partner choice or selective rewards, and may be a general process that helps to preserve mutualistic interactions in nature.

摘要

种间互利共生关系往往容易不稳定,因为低收益成本比会迅速导致灭绝,或使互利共生关系转变为寄生宿主或捕食者 - 猎物关系。我们推测,互利共生关系的进化稳定性可能取决于一方互利共生者的收益和成本如何随其伙伴的种群密度变化,并且如果一个互利共生者能够影响种群统计学速率并调节其伙伴的种群密度,那么稳定性就能得以维持。我们在一个具有森伊塔仙人掌(Pachycereus schottii) - 森伊塔蛾(Upiga virescens)相互作用关键特征的互利共生模型中检验了这一假设,在该模型中,授粉的收益以及幼虫消耗种子对植物适合度的成本取决于传粉者密度。我们发现,植物可以通过将资源分配用于生产过量花朵(以牺牲果实为代价)来最大化其适合度。过量花朵生产导致的果实败育降低了传粉种子消费者的成虫前期存活率,并将其密度维持在一个会使互利共生关系不稳定的阈值以下。这种过量花朵生产和果实败育的策略对于很少开花且很少或没有果实败育的欺骗性植物的入侵具有趋同性且在进化上是稳定的。这种实现进化稳定互利共生关系的新机制,即种间种群调节,在性质上不同于其他涉及伙伴选择或选择性奖励的机制,并且可能是一个有助于在自然界中维持互利共生相互作用的普遍过程。

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