Haack Susan
School of Law, University of Miami, 1311 Miller Drive, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA.
Am J Public Health. 2005;95 Suppl 1:S66-73. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2004.044529.
Apparently equating the question of whether expert testimony is reliable with the question of whether it is genuinely scientific, in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc (1993) the US Supreme Court ran together Karl Popper's and Carl Hempel's incompatible philosophies of science. But there can be no criterion discriminating scientific, and hence reliable, testimony from the unscientific and unreliable; for not all, and not only, scientific evidence is reliable. In subsequent rulings (General Electric Co v Joiner, 1997; Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 1999) the Court has backed quietly away from Daubert's confused philosophy of science, but not from federal judges' responsibilities for screening expert testimony. Efforts to educate judges scientifically, and increased use of court-appointed experts are, at best, only partial solutions to the problems with scientific testimony.
在“道伯特诉美孚制药公司案”（1993年）中，美国最高法院显然将专家证词是否可靠的问题等同于它是否真正科学的问题，从而把卡尔·波普尔和卡尔·亨普尔互不相容的科学哲学混为一谈。但是，不可能有一个标准来区分科学的、因而可靠的证词与不科学的、不可靠的证词；因为并非所有科学证据都是可靠的，而且可靠的证据也不只是科学证据。在随后的裁决中（“通用电气公司诉乔伊纳案”，1997年；“锦湖轮胎公司诉卡迈克尔案”，1999年），最高法院已悄然摒弃了道伯特案中混乱的科学哲学，但并未放弃联邦法官筛选专家证词的职责。对法官进行科学教育的努力以及更多地使用法庭指定的专家，充其量只是解决科学证词问题的部分办法。
