Pickard Susan, Sheaff Rod, Dowling Bernard
National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, Manchester University, Williamson Building, UK.
Soc Sci Med. 2006 Jul;63(2):373-83. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2005.12.016. Epub 2006 Feb 10.
Hirschman contrasts exit and voice as 'recuperation' mechanisms for making organisations responsive to users. However, the emergence of health-care quasi-markets and of network governance structures since Hirschman necessitate revising his theory, for they complicate the relationships between governance structures and recuperation mechanisms. Using a case study of nine primary care trusts (PCTs), this paper analyses the recuperation mechanisms, governance structures and relations between them in primary care in England. User voice can be exercised through dedicated networks besides hierarchies. As well as the 'user exit' described by Hirschman, two new 'exit' mechanisms now exist in quasi-markets. Commissioner exit occurs when a third-party payer stops using a given provider. Professional proxy exit occurs when a general practitioner (GP) fund-holder (or analogous budget-holder) behaves similarly. Neither exit mechanism requires the existence of mechanisms for user exit from healthcare purchasers, provided strong voice mechanisms exist instead to make commissioners responsive to users' demands. Establishing such voice mechanisms is not straightforward, however, as the experience of English PCTs illustrates.
赫希曼将退出和发声对比为促使组织回应用户的“补救”机制。然而,自赫希曼时代以来,医疗保健准市场和网络治理结构的出现使得有必要修正他的理论,因为它们使治理结构与补救机制之间的关系变得复杂。本文通过对九个初级保健信托基金(PCTs)的案例研究,分析了英格兰初级保健中的补救机制、治理结构及其相互关系。除了层级结构外,用户还可以通过专门的网络来表达意见。除了赫希曼所描述的“用户退出”,准市场中现在还存在两种新的“退出”机制。当第三方支付者停止使用某一特定供应商时,就会发生委托方退出。当全科医生(GP)基金持有者(或类似的预算持有者)有类似行为时,就会发生专业代理退出。只要存在强大的发声机制以使委托方回应用户需求,这两种退出机制都不要求存在用户从医疗保健购买者处退出的机制。然而,正如英格兰初级保健信托基金的经验所示,建立这样的发声机制并非易事。