Rowthorn Robert
Economics Faculty, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 9DD, UK.
J Theor Biol. 2006 Aug 21;241(4):774-90. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.01.014. Epub 2006 Mar 3.
This paper explores the validity of Hamilton's rule in the case of other-only altruism in which the benefits are shared by other members of the sibling group excluding the donor. It presents a model of competition between two alleles which code for different kinds of altruism. It derives a simple replicator equation for allele frequencies under conditions of strong selection. This equation does not depend on the size of the sibling group. In mathematical form, the equation is similar to Hamilton's original rule in the case of inbreeding, although the causal mechanism is different. The paper derives a simple criterion to determine whether there will be a polymorphism in which both alleles coexist permanently. Such an event is rare and victory will normally go to the allele with the higher value of 1/2b-c, where b is the total benefit which an offspring confers on its siblings and c is the cost to the donor. The paper also considers how an offspring will behave in particular circumstances. Using a specialized version of the basic model, it shows how, in the absence of polymorphism, natural selection should take the system towards the point of 50% marginal altruism. With this type of altruism, an offspring will perform any act for which the expected cost to the donor is at most half the expected benefit to its siblings. Acts which do not satisfy this criterion are not performed. This accords with Haldane's quip that he would sacrifice his own life for two of his brothers, but not for less. Numerical simulation is used to explore these issues in greater depth. The paper also examines briefly the implications of heterozygote advantage for Hamilton's rule. It concludes with a brief discussion of the connection between other-only altruism and whole-group altruism, in which the donor gains some benefit from its actions.
本文探讨了汉密尔顿法则在仅针对其他个体的利他行为中的有效性,在这种利他行为中,利益由同胞群体中除捐赠者之外的其他成员共享。它提出了一个关于编码不同类型利他行为的两个等位基因之间竞争的模型。在强选择条件下,推导了等位基因频率的一个简单复制方程。这个方程不依赖于同胞群体的大小。在数学形式上,该方程在近亲繁殖情况下类似于汉密尔顿的原始法则,尽管因果机制不同。本文推导了一个简单的标准来确定是否会存在一种多态性,即两个等位基因永久共存。这样的事件很罕见,通常获胜的将是具有较高1/2b - c值的等位基因,其中b是一个后代给予其同胞的总利益,c是对捐赠者的成本。本文还考虑了一个后代在特定情况下的行为方式。使用基本模型的一个专门版本,它展示了在不存在多态性的情况下,自然选择应如何使系统趋向于50%边际利他主义的点。对于这种类型的利他行为,一个后代会执行任何对捐赠者的预期成本至多为对其同胞预期利益一半的行为。不满足该标准的行为不会被执行。这与霍尔丹的妙语相符,即他愿意为两个兄弟牺牲自己的生命,但少于两个则不愿意。数值模拟被用于更深入地探讨这些问题。本文还简要研究了杂合子优势对汉密尔顿法则的影响。最后简要讨论了仅针对其他个体的利他行为与群体整体利他行为之间的联系,在群体整体利他行为中,捐赠者从其行为中获得一些利益。