Zaitchik Deborah, Koff Elissa, Brownell Hiram, Winner Ellen, Albert Marilyn
Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA.
Cogn Neuropsychiatry. 2004 Nov;9(4):301-13. doi: 10.1080/13546800344000246.
The ability to determine what someone thinks or knows often requires an individual to infer the mental state of another person, an ability typically referred to as one's "theory of mind". The present study tests this ability in patients with mild-to-moderate Alzheimer's disease (AD).
Three theory of mind tests and three standardised neuropsychological tests were presented to a group of patients with AD (n = 25) and a group of healthy elderly controls (n = 15).
On the first two theory of mind tasks, the performance of the AD patients was nearly perfect and did not differ from that of the controls: AD patients showed no difficulties in either attributing a false belief to another person, or in recognising their own previous false beliefs. On the third theory of mind task, where the key information was embedded in a story narrative, AD patients per formed significantly worse than controls. However, their performance on this task was similar to the control condition, which used a similar story but which did not involve beliefs.
These results, as well as those involving correlations between the neuropsychological tests and performance on the third task, suggest that the AD patients' difficulty may be secondary to their cognitive impairments, rather than a primary impairment in theory of mind.
确定某人的想法或所知内容的能力通常需要个体推断他人的心理状态,这种能力通常被称为“心理理论”。本研究对轻度至中度阿尔茨海默病(AD)患者的这种能力进行了测试。
对一组AD患者(n = 25)和一组健康老年对照者(n = 15)进行了三项心理理论测试和三项标准化神经心理学测试。
在前两项心理理论任务中,AD患者的表现近乎完美,与对照组无异:AD患者在将错误信念归因于他人或识别自己先前的错误信念方面均无困难。在第三项心理理论任务中,关键信息嵌入在故事叙述中,AD患者的表现明显比对照组差。然而,他们在这项任务上的表现与使用类似故事但不涉及信念的对照条件相似。
这些结果以及神经心理学测试与第三项任务表现之间的相关性表明,AD患者的困难可能继发于其认知障碍,而非心理理论的原发性损害。