• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

收益单调博弈动力学与最大团问题

Payoff-monotonic game dynamics and the maximum clique problem.

作者信息

Pelillo Marcello, Torsello Andrea

机构信息

Dipartimento di Informatica, Università Ca' Foscari di Venezia 30172 Venezia Mestre, Italy.

出版信息

Neural Comput. 2006 May;18(5):1215-58. doi: 10.1162/089976606776241011.

DOI:10.1162/089976606776241011
PMID:16595063
Abstract

Evolutionary game-theoretic models and, in particular, the so-called replicator equations have recently proven to be remarkably effective at approximately solving the maximum clique and related problems. The approach is centered around a classic result from graph theory that formulates the maximum clique problem as a standard (continuous) quadratic program and exploits the dynamical properties of these models, which, under a certain symmetry assumption, possess a Lyapunov function. In this letter, we generalize previous work along these lines in several respects. We introduce a wide family of game-dynamic equations known as payoff-monotonic dynamics, of which replicator dynamics are a special instance, and show that they enjoy precisely the same dynamical properties as standard replicator equations. These properties make any member of this family a potential heuristic for solving standard quadratic programs and, in particular, the maximum clique problem. Extensive simulations, performed on random as well as DIMACS benchmark graphs, show that this class contains dynamics that are considerably faster than and at least as accurate as replicator equations. One problem associated with these models, however, relates to their inability to escape from poor local solutions. To overcome this drawback, we focus on a particular subclass of payoff-monotonic dynamics used to model the evolution of behavior via imitation processes and study the stability of their equilibria when a regularization parameter is allowed to take on negative values. A detailed analysis of these properties suggests a whole class of annealed imitation heuristics for the maximum clique problem, which are based on the idea of varying the parameter during the imitation optimization process in a principled way, so as to avoid unwanted inefficient solutions. Experiments show that the proposed annealing procedure does help to avoid poor local optima by initially driving the dynamics toward promising regions in state space. Furthermore, the models outperform state-of-the-art neural network algorithms for maximum clique, such as mean field annealing, and compare well with powerful continuous-based heuristics.

摘要

进化博弈论模型,尤其是所谓的复制方程,最近已被证明在近似求解最大团及相关问题方面非常有效。该方法围绕图论中的一个经典结果展开,该结果将最大团问题表述为一个标准的(连续)二次规划,并利用这些模型的动力学性质,在一定的对称假设下,这些模型具有一个李雅普诺夫函数。在这封信中,我们在几个方面对以前沿这些思路开展的工作进行了推广。我们引入了一类广泛的博弈动力学方程,称为收益单调动力学,复制动力学是其中的一个特殊实例,并表明它们具有与标准复制方程完全相同的动力学性质。这些性质使该族中的任何一个成员都成为求解标准二次规划,特别是最大团问题的潜在启发式方法。在随机以及DIMACS基准图上进行的大量模拟表明,这类动力学比复制方程快得多且至少同样准确。然而,与这些模型相关的一个问题是它们无法摆脱较差的局部解。为了克服这一缺点,我们关注用于通过模仿过程对行为演化进行建模的收益单调动力学的一个特定子类,并研究当正则化参数被允许取负值时其平衡点的稳定性。对这些性质的详细分析提出了一类用于最大团问题的退火模仿启发式方法,其基于在模仿优化过程中有原则地改变参数的思想,以避免出现不必要的低效解。实验表明,所提出的退火过程确实有助于通过最初将动力学驱动到状态空间中有希望的区域来避免较差的局部最优解。此外,这些模型在最大团问题上优于诸如平均场退火等当前最先进的神经网络算法,并且与强大的基于连续的启发式方法相比也毫不逊色。

相似文献

1
Payoff-monotonic game dynamics and the maximum clique problem.收益单调博弈动力学与最大团问题
Neural Comput. 2006 May;18(5):1215-58. doi: 10.1162/089976606776241011.
2
Approximating the maximum weight clique using replicator dynamics.使用复制动力学逼近最大权团。
IEEE Trans Neural Netw. 2000;11(6):1228-41. doi: 10.1109/72.883403.
3
An impatient evolutionary algorithm with probabilistic tabu search for unified solution of some NP-hard problems in graph and set theory via clique finding.一种带有概率禁忌搜索的不耐烦进化算法,用于通过团发现对图论和集合论中的一些NP难问题进行统一求解。
IEEE Trans Syst Man Cybern B Cybern. 2008 Jun;38(3):645-66. doi: 10.1109/TSMCB.2008.915645.
4
An efficient approximation algorithm for finding a maximum clique using Hopfield network learning.一种使用霍普菲尔德网络学习来寻找最大团的高效近似算法。
Neural Comput. 2003 Jul;15(7):1605-19. doi: 10.1162/089976603321891828.
5
Evolutionary games on networks and payoff invariance under replicator dynamics.网络上的进化博弈与复制者动力学下的收益不变性
Biosystems. 2009 Jun;96(3):213-22. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.02.002. Epub 2009 Feb 27.
6
Replicator equations, maximal cliques, and graph isomorphism.复制者方程、最大团与图同构。
Neural Comput. 1999 Nov 15;11(8):1933-55. doi: 10.1162/089976699300016034.
7
A generalized adaptive dynamics framework can describe the evolutionary Ultimatum Game.一个广义的自适应动力学框架能够描述进化最后通牒博弈。
J Theor Biol. 2001 Mar 21;209(2):173-9. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2251.
8
Approximating maximum clique with a Hopfield network.用霍普菲尔德网络逼近最大团。
IEEE Trans Neural Netw. 1995;6(3):724-35. doi: 10.1109/72.377977.
9
FPGA implementation of a stochastic neural network for monotonic pseudo-Boolean optimization.用于单调伪布尔优化的随机神经网络的现场可编程门阵列实现。
Neural Netw. 2008 Aug;21(6):872-9. doi: 10.1016/j.neunet.2008.06.018. Epub 2008 Jul 3.
10
Pairwise competition and the replicator equation.成对竞争与复制方程。
Bull Math Biol. 2003 Nov;65(6):1163-72. doi: 10.1016/j.bulm.2003.08.001.