Atherly Adam, Dowd Bryan E
Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
Health Care Financ Rev. 2005 Spring;26(3):93-104.
This study estimates the effect of Medicare Advantage (MA) payments and State Medicaid policies on the choice by Medicaid eligible Medicare beneficiaries to either join a MA plan, remain in the fee-for-service (FFS) and enroll in Medicaid (dually enrolled), or remain in FFS Medicare without joining Medicaid. Individual plan choice was modeled using a multinomial logit. The sample includes Medicaid-eligible Medicare beneficiaries (including specified low income Medicare beneficiaries [SLMBs] and qualified Medicare beneficiaries [QMBs]) drawn from the 2000 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). We find a $10 increase in monthly MA payment reduces the probability of dual enrollment by four percentage points, and FFS Medicare enrollment by 11 percentage points.
本研究估计了医疗保险优势(MA)支付和州医疗补助政策对符合医疗补助条件的医疗保险受益人的选择的影响,这些受益人可以选择加入MA计划、留在按服务收费(FFS)并加入医疗补助(双重参保),或者留在FFS医疗保险而不加入医疗补助。使用多项逻辑回归模型对个体计划选择进行建模。样本包括从2000年医疗保险当前受益人调查(MCBS)中抽取的符合医疗补助条件的医疗保险受益人(包括特定低收入医疗保险受益人[SLMBs]和合格医疗保险受益人[QMBs])。我们发现,MA每月支付增加10美元会使双重参保的概率降低4个百分点,使FFS医疗保险参保率降低11个百分点。