Synofzik Matthis, Vosgerau Gottfried, Newen Albert
Department of Cognitive Neurology, Hertie Institute of Clinical Brain Research, University of Tübingen, Hoppe-Seyler-Str. 3, 72076 Tübingen, Germany.
Conscious Cogn. 2008 Mar;17(1):219-39. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010. Epub 2007 May 4.
There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the "comparator model". In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts.
越来越多的实证研究在探究行动者感，即我们对自身行为发起者身份的认知。许多研究试图将行动者感与一种被称为“比较器模型”的内部前馈机制联系起来。在本文中，我们明确区分了行动者感的非概念层面和行动者判断的概念层面。通过分析近期的实证研究，我们表明比较器模型无法对二者做出解释。相反，我们主张一种两步解释：不同行动者指标的多因素加权过程构成了行动者感，在第二步中，这种行动者感由概念模块进一步处理，以形成归因判断。然后，这个新框架被应用于精神分裂症中行动者感的紊乱情况，比较器模型在这方面同样失效。我们还讨论了另外两个扩展内容：我们表明比较器模型既无法扩展以解释所有权感（所有权感也必须区分为所有权感觉和所有权判断），也无法解释思维的行动者感。然而，我们的框架能够为行动和思维的行动者感提供一个统一的解释。
