Grinols Earl L, Henderson James W
Department of Economics, Baylor University, Waco, Texas 76798, USA.
Pharmacoeconomics. 2007;25(5):355-63. doi: 10.2165/00019053-200725050-00001.
Pharmaceutical patents are anachronistic holdovers from an era in which modern economic understanding and tax tools were unavailable. Superior mechanisms lie somewhere between a first best pricing solution for the entire economy at one extreme and the current arrangements at the other. We discuss the economics of suggested alternatives and suggest that the intertemporal bounty is the best way to meet the multiple objectives of immediate distribution at marginal cost pricing of newly innovated patented drugs and easily administered, efficient inducement to continued innovation. The intertemporal bounty prevents the expansion of monopoly power resulting from co-pay or -insurance provisions common to modern prescription drug plans.
药品专利是一个时代遗留下来的不合时宜的产物，在那个时代，现代经济理解和税收工具尚未出现。最优机制处于一个极端的针对整个经济的最优定价解决方案与另一个极端的当前安排之间。我们讨论了建议替代方案的经济学原理，并认为跨期赏金是实现多个目标的最佳方式，这些目标包括以边际成本定价立即分销新创新的专利药品，以及以易于管理、高效的方式激励持续创新。跨期赏金可防止因现代处方药计划中常见的共付或保险条款而导致的垄断权力扩张。
