Kelman Herbert C
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Am Psychol. 2007 May-Jun;62(4):287-303. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.62.4.287.
The vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since 1967 are analyzed using attitudes and related concepts where relevant. The 1967 war returned the two peoples' zero-sum conflict around national identity to its origin as a conflict within the land both peoples claim. Gradually, new attitudes evolved regarding the necessity and possibility of negotiations toward a two-state solution based on mutual recognition, which became the building stones of the 1993 Oslo agreement. Lacking a commitment to a final outcome, the Oslo-based peace process was hampered by reserve options, which increased avoidance at the expense of approach tendencies as the parties moved toward a final agreement. The resulting breakdown of the process in 2000 produced clashing narratives, reflecting different anchors for judgment and classical mirror images. Public support for violence increased, even as public opinion continued to favor a negotiated two-state solution. Reviving the peace process requires mutual reassurance about the availability of a partner for negotiating a principled peace based on a historic compromise that meets the basic needs and validates the identities of both peoples.
本文在相关之处运用态度及相关概念，分析了自1967年以来巴以和平进程的变迁。1967年战争使围绕民族身份的两国零和冲突回归其根源，成为双方所宣称土地上的内部冲突。逐渐地，对于基于相互承认进行两国方案谈判的必要性和可能性，人们形成了新的态度，这些态度成为1993年《奥斯陆协议》的基石。由于缺乏对最终结果的承诺，基于奥斯陆的和平进程受到保留选项的阻碍，随着各方朝着最终协议迈进，这些选项增加了回避行为，以接近倾向为代价。2000年该进程的破裂产生了相互冲突的叙述，反映了不同的判断依据和经典的镜像。即使公众舆论继续支持通过谈判达成两国方案，但对暴力的公众支持却有所增加。重启和平进程需要双方相互保证，有一个伙伴愿意基于满足双方基本需求并认可双方身份的历史性妥协，来谈判达成有原则的和平。
