Llinás R R, Paré D
Department of Physiology and Biophysics, New York University Medical Center, NY 10016.
Neuroscience. 1991;44(3):521-35. doi: 10.1016/0306-4522(91)90075-y.
Following a set of studies concerning the intrinsic electrophysiology of mammalian central neurons in relation to global brain function, we reach the following conclusions: (i) the main difference between wakefulness and paradoxical sleep lies in the weight given to sensory afferents in cognitive images; (ii) otherwise, wakefulness and paradoxical sleep are fundamentally equivalent brain states probably subserved by an intrinsic thalamo-cortical loop. From this assumption, we conclude that wakefulness is an intrinsic functional realm, modulated by sensory parameters. In support of this hypothesis, we review morphological studies of the thalamocortical system, which indicate that only a minor part of its connectivity is devoted to the transfer of direct sensory input. Rather, most of the connectivity is geared to the generation of internal functional modes, which may, in principle, operate in the presence or absence of sensory activation. These considerations lead us to challenge the traditional Jamesian view of brain function according to which consciousness is generated as an exclusive by-product of sensory input. Instead, we argue that consciousness is fundamentally a closed-loop property, in which the ability of cells to be intrinsically active plays a central role. We further discuss the importance of spatial and temporal mapping in the elaboration of cognitive and perceptual constructs.
在进行了一系列关于哺乳动物中枢神经元内在电生理与全脑功能关系的研究后,我们得出以下结论:(i)清醒状态与异相睡眠之间的主要差异在于认知图像中给予感觉传入的权重;(ii)否则,清醒状态和异相睡眠是基本等效的脑状态,可能由一个内在的丘脑 - 皮质环路维持。基于这一假设,我们得出清醒是一个由感觉参数调节的内在功能领域。为支持这一假设,我们回顾了丘脑皮质系统的形态学研究,这些研究表明其连接性中只有一小部分用于直接感觉输入的传递。相反,大部分连接性是为了产生内部功能模式,原则上,这些模式在有无感觉激活的情况下都可能运行。这些思考使我们对传统的詹姆斯式脑功能观点提出质疑,按照该观点,意识是作为感觉输入的唯一副产品产生的。相反,我们认为意识从根本上说是一种闭环属性,其中细胞内在活动的能力起着核心作用。我们进一步讨论了空间和时间映射在构建认知和感知结构中的重要性。