Pastore N
Queens College, City University of New York.
J Hist Behav Sci. 1991 Oct;27(4):341-51. doi: 10.1002/1520-6696(199110)27:4<341::aid-jhbs2300270403>3.0.co;2-g.
Wittgenstein's objections to Köhler and gestalt psychology are critically examined. Principal features of Köhler's Gestalt Psychology are discussed that are relevant to Wittgenstein's views. They include Köhler's concepts of "subjective" and "objective" experiences, "sensory organization," and "empiristic theory." Wittgenstein's objections, which focus on the concept of sensory organization, are examined. Wittgenstein employs the term "aspect," which is derived from the findings of gestalt psychology, as a replacement for Köhler's term "sensory organization." After tracing his uses of aspect, it is shown that aspect is a superordinate entity distinct from 'sensory content' (colors and shapes). This dualism of aspect and sensory content is of the same kind that prevailed in the empiristic theory of visual perception. Wittgenstein's adherence to the empiristic theory is discussed. Finally, the difference between Wittgenstein's aspect and Köhler's sensory organization is examined.
维特根斯坦对苛勒及格式塔心理学的反对意见受到批判性审视。文中讨论了苛勒格式塔心理学与维特根斯坦观点相关的主要特征。这些特征包括苛勒的“主观”与“客观”体验、“感觉组织”及“经验主义理论”等概念。文中考察了维特根斯坦聚焦于感觉组织概念的反对意见。维特根斯坦采用源自格式塔心理学研究结果的“面相”一词，来取代苛勒的“感觉组织”一词。在追溯他对“面相”的使用后，表明“面相”是一种与“感觉内容”（颜色和形状）不同的上位实体。“面相”与感觉内容的这种二元论与视觉感知经验主义理论中盛行的二元论属于同一类型。文中讨论了维特根斯坦对经验主义理论的坚持。最后，考察了维特根斯坦的“面相”与苛勒的“感觉组织”之间的差异。
