Barsalou Lawrence W
Department of Psychology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322, USA.
Annu Rev Psychol. 2008;59:617-45. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639.
Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain's modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition. Accumulating behavioral and neural evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on perception, memory, knowledge, language, thought, social cognition, and development. Theories of grounded cognition are also reviewed, as are origins of the area and common misperceptions of it. Theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues are raised whose future treatment is likely to affect the growth and impact of grounded cognition.
具身认知反对传统观点,即认知是模块化系统中对抽象符号的计算,独立于大脑用于感知、行动和内省的模态系统。相反,具身认知提出模态模拟、身体状态和情境行动是认知的基础。本文从感知、记忆、知识、语言、思维、社会认知和发展等方面的研究中,综述了支持这一观点的越来越多的行为和神经证据。本文还综述了具身认知理论,以及该领域的起源和常见误解。同时提出了理论、实证和方法学问题,其未来的探讨可能会影响具身认知的发展及其影响力。