Hennessy David A
Department of Economics and Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070, USA.
Health Econ. 2008 Apr;17(4):503-11. doi: 10.1002/hec.1270.
Suppose one could expend effort to prevent probabilistic transition to an adverse state, and also effort to expedite probabilistic transition to a beneficial state. Bearing in mind that the efforts occur in different states, should these efforts substitute or complement? Two appealing arguments are in conflict. If cure effort is costly, then the incentive to prevent should be high in order to avoid future cure effort costs, i.e. efforts are gross substitutes in demand. If prevention effort is costly, then the incentive to cure should be low since recidivism is likely, i.e. efforts complement. In a lifetime present value model, we show that both arguments have merit. We also show that the prevalence of the adverse state can rise with a subsidy on cure effort costs.
假设一个人可以付出努力来防止向不利状态的概率性转变，同时也付出努力来加速向有利状态的概率性转变。考虑到这些努力发生在不同的状态下，这些努力应该相互替代还是相互补充呢？两种有吸引力的观点相互冲突。如果治愈努力成本高昂，那么为了避免未来的治愈努力成本，预防的动机就应该很高，即努力在需求上是完全替代的。如果预防努力成本高昂，那么由于复发很可能发生，治愈的动机就应该很低，即努力是互补的。在一个终身现值模型中，我们表明这两种观点都有道理。我们还表明，不利状态的流行率可能会随着对治愈努力成本的补贴而上升。
