Grabowski David C
Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA.
Milbank Q. 2007 Dec;85(4):579-610. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0009.2007.00502.x.
The structure of Medicare and Medicaid creates conflicting incentives regarding dually eligible beneficiaries without coordinating their care. Both Medicare and Medicaid have an interest in limiting their costs, and neither has an incentive to take responsibility for the management or quality of care. Examples of misaligned incentives are Medicare's cost-sharing rules, cost shifting within home health care and nursing homes, and cost shifting across chronic and acute care settings. Several policy initiatives--capitation, pay-for-performance, and the shift of the dually eligible population's Medicaid costs to the federal government--may address these conflicting incentives, but all have strengths and weaknesses. With the aging baby boom generation and projected federal and state budget shortfalls, this issue will be a continuing focus of policymakers in the coming decades.
医疗保险和医疗补助计划的结构在涉及双重资格受益人的问题上产生了相互冲突的激励措施,却没有对他们的护理进行协调。医疗保险和医疗补助计划都有意限制自身成本,而且都没有动力去负责护理的管理或质量。激励措施不一致的例子包括医疗保险的费用分摊规则、家庭医疗保健和疗养院内部的成本转移,以及慢性病和急症护理环境之间的成本转移。一些政策举措——按人头付费、绩效付费,以及将双重资格人群的医疗补助成本转移给联邦政府——可能会解决这些相互冲突的激励措施,但它们都各有优缺点。随着婴儿潮一代的老龄化以及预计的联邦和州预算短缺,这个问题在未来几十年仍将是政策制定者持续关注的焦点。