Wells Gary L, Quinlivan Deah S
Department of Psychology, Iowa State University, West 112 Lago, Ames, IA 50011, USA.
Law Hum Behav. 2009 Feb;33(1):1-24. doi: 10.1007/s10979-008-9130-3. Epub 2008 Feb 27.
The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling concerning suggestive eyewitness identification procedures (Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977, 432 U.S. 98) has not been revisited by the Court in the intervening 30+ years. Meanwhile, scientific studies of eyewitnesses have progressed and DNA exonerations show that mistaken identification is the primary cause of convictions of the innocent. We analyzed the two-inquiry logic in Manson in light of eyewitness science. Several problems are discussed. Ironically, we note that suggestive identification procedures (determined in the first inquiry) boost the eyewitnesses' standing on three of the five criteria (used in the second inquiry) that are used to decide whether the suggestive procedures were a problem. The net effect undermines safeguards intended by the Court and destroys incentives to avoid suggestive procedures.
美国最高法院关于诱导性目击证人指认程序的裁决(曼森诉布雷斯韦特案,1977年,美国最高法院判例汇编第432卷,第98页)在随后的30多年里未被最高法院重新审议。与此同时,对目击证人的科学研究取得了进展,DNA无罪释放案例表明,错误指认是无辜者被定罪的主要原因。我们根据目击证人科学对曼森案中的两步调查逻辑进行了分析。讨论了几个问题。具有讽刺意味的是,我们注意到诱导性指认程序(在第一步调查中确定)在用于决定诱导性程序是否存在问题的五个标准(在第二步调查中使用)中的三个标准上提高了目击证人的可信度。最终结果破坏了最高法院原本意图的保障措施,并消除了避免采用诱导性程序的动机。