Zaitchik Deborah, Solomon Gregg E A
Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, USA. dzaitchiksamet@partners
Cogn Neuropsychol. 2008 Feb;25(1):27-37. doi: 10.1080/02643290801904059.
Some patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) reveal low-level impairment in their concepts of living things (i.e., forgetting that zebras are striped). To test for more profound impairment, we investigated the concept alive--a "higher order" concept spanning every member of the domain. Many elderly controls were animists, attributing life to inanimates capable of self-generated activity (the sun, fire). Most AD patients were animists, with half even attributing life to inanimates whose activity is not self-generated (cars, lamps). Adult animists, like young children who have not yet acquired biological concepts, overattributed life to active inanimates. We believe this reflects an innate disposition to view active entities as agents, and that agency interferes with the biological concept alive. This interference, we suggest, reflects degradation of biological concepts in the face of spared perception of agents. It sheds light on the nature of fundamental questions concerning conceptual organization, innate endowment, and conceptual change.
一些阿尔茨海默病(AD)患者在生物概念方面表现出轻度损害(例如,忘记斑马身上有条纹)。为了测试更严重的损害情况,我们研究了“有生命”这一概念——一个涵盖该领域每个成员的“高阶”概念。许多老年对照者是泛灵论者,将生命赋予能够自我产生活动的无生命物体(太阳、火)。大多数AD患者也是泛灵论者,其中一半人甚至将生命赋予其活动并非自我产生的无生命物体(汽车、灯)。成年泛灵论者,就像尚未获得生物学概念的幼儿一样,过度将生命赋予活跃的无生命物体。我们认为,这反映了一种将活跃实体视为主体的先天倾向,并且这种主体性干扰了“有生命”这一生物学概念。我们认为,这种干扰反映了在对主体的感知未受损的情况下生物学概念的退化。它揭示了有关概念组织、先天禀赋和概念变化的基本问题的本质。